September 18, 2026

What happened

Melapress surveyed 319 WordPress professionals, including agency staff, developers, designers, site owners and administrators, and found that most had experienced at least one known security incident. [1] [2]

Fewer than three in ten respondents had a breach recovery plan. [3]

Why it matters

The article describes a recovery plan as establishing in advance who responds, where clean backups are kept, and who must be notified. [4]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Melapress, a maker of WordPress security plugins, surveyed 319 WordPress professionals and found that most had dealt with at least one known security incident.

2. [2]

   The respondents build and run WordPress sites for a living: agency staff, developers, designers, site owners and administrators.

3. [3]

   Across the whole group, fewer than three in ten have a breach recovery plan.

4. [4]

   A recovery plan settles in advance who responds, where the clean backups are, and who needs to be told.

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What happened

Hush Security’s report found hardcoded API keys, access tokens, and other credentials used by AI coding tools in publicly accessible MCP configuration files on GitHub. [1]

The company analyzed around 82,000 configuration files and found hardcoded credential literals in 12% of credential slots. [2]

Why it matters

The exposed hardcoded credentials could potentially expose connected services and systems. [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Hardcoded API keys, access tokens and other credentials used by AI coding tools have been found in publicly accessible MCP configuration files on GitHub, according to research from Hush Security’s The State of MCP Configuration: The Identity Security Gaps report.

2. [2]

   The company analyzed around 82,000 configuration files and found that 12% of credential slots contained a hardcoded credential literal, potentially exposing credentials for connected services and systems.

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What happened

Parcel-delivery phishing campaigns impersonate courier services and typically direct recipients to fake courier websites to collect personal and financial information. [1] [2] [3] [4]

A recent campaign impersonating Belgium’s bpost claimed that a €4.95 customs fee prevented delivery, then requested personal information, card details, and banking information. [5] [6] [7] [8]

Why it matters

The campaign used URL shortening and multiple fake bpost domains; its pages copied bpost branding and displayed security labels that the source says did not prove the site or payment was secure. [9] [10] [11]

Submitted card details may be used for fraudulent purchases or sold to criminals, while personal and banking information may support later, more convincing scams. [12] [13]

Source-supported guidance

The source advises checking the sender and destination, being wary of unexpected fees or refunds, and treating requests for extensive financial information—especially an IBAN plus card details—as suspicious. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Parcel delivery phishing campaigns appear around the world under different courier names.

2. [2]

   In the United States, the messages commonly impersonate USPS and claim that a package has an invalid address or could not be delivered.

3. [3]

   Similar messages impersonate Colissimo and Chronopost in France, Correos in Spain, Poste Italiane in Italy, and PostNL in the Netherlands.

4. [4]

   The details vary, but the aim is usually the same: to persuade you to visit a fake courier website and provide personal and financial information.

5. [5]

   A fake bpost delivery email A recent campaign targeting customers of the Belgian postal service bpost begins with an email claiming that a package could not be delivered because €4.95 in customs duties has not been paid.

6. [6]

   Your package could not be delivered on September 9, 2026, because the customs duties (€4.95) have not been paid.

7. [7]

   However, the website does not stop at collecting the supposed fee.

8. [8]

   It asks for personal information, card details, and banking information.

9. [9]

   How the scam works The link first passes through a URL-shortening service ( hxxps://qr[.]paps[.]jp/1GWsa ) before redirecting to a fake bpost site.

10. [10]

    The campaign used several fake bpost domains, including: hxxps://bpost[.]be-pakje-ontvangen-nl-recevoir-colis-fr[.]my[.]id/ bpost[.]center , which is the domain shown in the screenshots below.

11. [11]

    The page copies bpost’s branding and displays security claims such as “Secure SSL connection,” “256-bit SSL,” “SEPA compliant,” and “Secure payment.” These labels were added by the scammers and do not prove that the page or payment is secure.

12. [12]

    Once submitted, card details may be used for fraudulent purchases or sold to other criminals.

13. [13]

    The personal and banking information may also be used to make later scams more convincing.

14. [14]

    Check the sender and destination.

15. [15]

    A message may use a courier’s name while coming from an unrelated email address or linking to a different domain.

16. [16]

    Be wary of unexpected fees or refunds.

17. [17]

    A small payment or promised refund can be used to persuade you to provide much more valuable information.

18. [18]

    Be wary of requests for extensive financial information.

19. [19]

    A request for an IBAN as well as card details should be treated with suspicion, particularly when it supposedly relates to a small delivery fee.

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What happened

AndroidX Security State libraries provide a more granular way to assess how securely patched an Android device is. [1]

Security State v1.1.0 and Security State Provider v1.0.0 let developers check the security status of individual device components. [2]

The libraries can indicate whether security updates are ready to be downloaded and installed on a specific device. [2]

Why it matters

The Security State Provider library offers a standard approach for phone manufacturers and developers building over-the-air update systems. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   New AndroidX Security State libraries provide a more granular way to determine how securely patched an Android device is.

2. [2]

   The stable Security State v1.1.0 and Security State Provider v1.0.0 libraries allow developers to check the security status of individual device components and determine whether security updates are ready to be downloaded and installed on a specific device.

3. [3]

   For phone manufacturers and developers who build over-the-air (OTA) update systems, the androidx.security.state.provider library provides a standard way … More → The post Android apps can now check security patches down to individual device components appeared first on Help Net Security .

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What happened

AIR reported a zero-click remote code execution vulnerability affecting Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot, and Gemini CLI. [1]

The researchers characterized the issue as the first supply-chain vulnerability in the AI agent ecosystem. [2]

The article reported that anyone running a major coding agent that installs marketplace plugins is exposed. [3]

Why it matters

AIR said exploitation could give an attacker the same reach into company systems and data as the employee running the affected agent. [1]

Known limitations

The headline states that two of the four affected agents remained unpatched, but the supplied text does not identify which agents or provide patch status details. [4]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Four major AI coding agents, Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and Gemini CLI, all share the same zero-click RCE vulnerability, one that could give an attacker the same reach into a company’s systems and data as the employee running the agent, according to AIR.

2. [2]

   “It is the first supply chain vulnerability of the AI agent ecosystem,” the researchers said.

3. [3]

   “Anyone running a major coding agent that installs plugins from a marketplace is exposed.

4. [4]

   The exposure … More → The post Zero-click RCE vulnerability hit four major AI coding agents, two remain unpatched appeared first on Help Net Security .

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What happened

Arcjet launched agent runtime security, a product intended to help engineering teams secure AI agents and provide security teams with governance and compliance evidence. [1]

The product provides observability, enforcement, and audit capabilities across agent workflows. [2]

Why it matters

The stated capabilities are intended to help teams discover running agents, control their actions, and understand what happened and why. [2]

The article frames AI agents as moving beyond chat interfaces into production workflows. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Arcjet has launched agent runtime security, a new product that helps engineering teams secure the AI agents they are building while giving security teams the governance and compliance evidence they need.

2. [2]

   Arcjet brings observability, enforcement, and audit capabilities across agent workflows so teams can discover which agents are running, control what they can do, and understand what happened and why.

3. [3]

   AI agents are moving beyond chat interfaces and into production workflows, where they can read … More → The post Arcjet brings security controls and audit trails to AI agents appeared first on Help Net Security .

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What happened

A financially motivated threat actor has been linked to developing and distributing PhantomRaven, a JavaScript-based information stealer, through the npm package registry. [1]

The developer was assessed with high confidence as likely having used a large language model to write the malware, based on verbose comments, placeholder code, and statistical token-analysis patterns. [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   A financially motivated threat actor has been linked to the development and distribution of a JavaScript (JS)-based information stealer known as PhantomRaven via the npm package registry.

2. [2]

   "The developer likely wrote the malware using a large language model (LLM), an assessment made with high confidence based on verbose comments, placeholder code, and statistical token-analysis patterns,"

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What happened

RatHat is an Android trojan distributed through deceptive phishing sites, malvertising, smishing campaigns and third-party forums that lure victims into manually installing malicious APKs. [1] [2] [3]

After installation, RatHat abuses Android SessionInstaller APIs and Accessibility Service access to install payloads and access protected APIs. [4] [5] [6] [7]

The malware uses Accessibility access to enable Developer Options and Wireless Debugging, read the ADB pairing code from the screen, and pair with the phone’s debug interface without user interaction. [8] [9] [10] [11]

RatHat deploys a disguised FRP reverse-proxy client that tunnels remote access to the phone’s ADB shell from the internet, including by bypassing NAT and firewall protections. [12] [13] [14] [15]

Its credential-theft capabilities include Accessibility-based keylogging, browser URL scraping, raw touch-coordinate capture from /dev/input, banking-app overlays, and SMS interception for 2FA codes. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

RatHat sends the live Accessibility tree to a generative AI assistant, which returns screen coordinates, on-screen text or navigation commands to direct automated interaction. [21] [22] [23] [24]

The malware can resist removal: it displays a fake Google Play error during uninstall and, if removal succeeds, an external Go agent can silently reinstall the APK and re-grant permissions. [25] [26] [27]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   RatHat combines AI-driven screen control, Android debugging abuse and advanced credential theft to give attackers deep control of infected phones.

2. [2]

   It starts the way most mobile fraud does: a text message or a shady ad pointing to a fake app store.

3. [3]

   “RatHat is primarily distributed through deceptive phishing sites promoted via malvertising, smishing campaigns, and third-party forums, luring victims into manually downloading malicious APKs that appear to be legitimate apps” reads the report published by Zimperium.

4. [4]

   The second stage is a DEX file loaded directly into memory through reflection.

5. [5]

   It contains the code needed to unpack and install the final malware.

6. [6]

   The droppers also abuse native Android SessionInstaller APIs to get around restrictions on app installation and Accessibility Services, allowing the malware to install its payload and access protected APIs.

7. [7]

   The malware first tries to gain access to Android’s Accessibility Service.

8. [8]

   It then uses that access to silently enable Developer Options and Wireless Debugging on the victim’s phone.

9. [9]

   It doesn’t need a second device, a cable, or a user to manually approve a USB debugging connection.

10. [10]

    RatHat uses the same Accessibility Service to read the ADB pairing code directly from the phone’s screen.

11. [11]

    It then pairs with the phone’s own debug interface without any user interaction.

12. [12]

    The malware then places two disguised native binaries in /data/local/tmp .

13. [13]

    The other, libmedia_codec.so , is a modified FRP reverse-proxy client.

14. [14]

    Its role is to create a tunnel that lets the attacker connect remotely to the phone’s ADB shell from anywhere on the internet.

15. [15]

    A separate Go-based agent runs a local server and uses a disguised FRP component to expose it to the internet, allowing attackers to bypass NAT and firewall protections.

16. [16]

    The credential theft itself runs on three tracks.

17. [17]

    There’s a standard Accessibility-based keylogger reading text fields, a second component scraping URLs straight out of browser address bars, and then something considerably more interesting: a hardware-level keylogger running from that same ADB shell, reading raw touch coordinates off /dev/input .

18. [18]

    It’s a workaround for FLAG_SECURE, custom keyboards, and lock-screen protections all at once, because none of those defenses touch the input driver itself.

19. [19]

    On the banking side, RatHat serves fake overlays on top of real banking and payment apps, WeChat and Alipay included, to grab PINs and login credentials while the person thinks they’re using the real interface.

20. [20]

    Combine that with SMS interception for 2FA codes and you’ve got full account takeover without the victim noticing anything unusual happened.

21. [21]

    RatHat serializes the phone’s live Accessibility tree into XML and sends it to a mainstream generative AI assistant, which returns screen coordinates and text so the malware can decide where to tap next.

22. [22]

    This AI is used for non-malicious actions including: Resolving a named target’s centre coordinates on the screen as JSON to direct synthetic clicks.

23. [23]

    Resolving a target’s actual on-screen text from the XML (without translating).

24. [24]

    Signaling automatic navigation commands like SCROLL_DOWN.” That single change is what separates RatHat from a decade of scripted Android RATs.

25. [25]

    Persistence is where things get properly ugly.

26. [26]

    Uninstall the app and it throws up a fake Google Play error to cancel the removal.

27. [27]

    Manage to force it through anyway, and the Go agent running outside the app’s lifecycle notices, silently reinstalls the APK, and re-grants every permission, accessibility included, without a single tap from the user.

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What happened

A Surfshark study tested whether people could distinguish human comments from AI-generated comments in a social-media setting. [1] [2]

The study included 1,722 participants worldwide, who correctly identified 40% of the bots presented to them overall. [2] [3]

Why it matters

The article reports that bots most likely to fool people were polite rather than loud or aggressive. [1] [4]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Most people can’t tell a bot from a human online, and the bots most likely to fool them are the polite ones, according to a new Surfshark study.

2. [2]

   The company analyzed 1,722 participants worldwide, testing their ability to separate human comments from AI-generated ones in a social media setting.

3. [3]

   Overall, people caught just 40% of the bots placed in front of them.

4. [4]

   (Source: Surfshark) The bots that slipped by most often weren’t loud or aggressive.

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What happened

Researchers discovered 13 npm packages that deliver a previously undocumented JavaScript stealer called WeaselBiscuit. [1]

OpenSourceMalware reported that WeaselBiscuit has functional overlaps with malware strains associated with the DPRK-linked Contagious Interview campaign, including BeaverTail; the supplied text ends before naming the second strain. [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a cluster of 13 npm packages that have been found to deliver a previously undocumented JavaScript stealer codenamed WeaselBiscuit.

2. [2]

   The new malware family, per OpenSourceMalware, exhibits functional overlaps with two malware strains associated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) Contagious Interview campaign: BeaverTail and

Read the original article →