September 25, 2026

What happened

Ping Identity announced Enterprise Personal Agent Access, an end-to-end approach combining discovery, secretless privileged access, and runtime control for personal AI agents. [1]

The announcement is described as enterprise security for personal AI agents. [1]

Known limitations

The supplied excerpt does not specify implementation details, deployment availability, affected products beyond the announced offering, or evidence of its effectiveness. [1] [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Ping Identity introduces enterprise security for personal AI agents Ping Identity announced an end-to-end approach that combines discovery, secretless privileged access and runtime control for personal AI agents.

2. [2]

   With Ping Identity’s Enterprise Personal Agent Access, companies can see which AI … More → The post New infosec products of the month: September 2026 appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

Cloudflare Containers had a flaw that let a paying customer read data left behind by other customers’ containers on the same server. [1]

The exposed data was from disk space released by earlier containers, rather than from a live workload. [2]

According to Cloudflare, an attacker could not choose whose leftover data they obtained. [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   A flaw in Cloudflare Containers let a paying customer read data that other customers' containers had left behind on the same server, Cloudflare and the researchers who found it said on Thursday.

2. [2]

   The data came from disk space that earlier containers had used and given up, not from any live workload, and an attacker could not choose whose data they got, according to Cloudflare.

Read the original article →

What happened

According to the SANS 2026 Threat Hunting Survey, half of security professionals identify data quality or quantity as their biggest barrier to effective threat hunting. [1]

Teams with working playbooks describe their logging as the ceiling for threat-hunting effectiveness, with gaps in cloud logging and identity telemetry cited most often. [2]

Why it matters

Respondents say logging gaps are especially harmful against attackers who blend in with legitimate activity. [3]

Known limitations

The supplied excerpt does not provide the survey sample size, methodology, or detailed recommendations for improving data quality or telemetry coverage. [1] [2] [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Half of security professionals name data quality or quantity as their biggest barrier to effective threat hunting, according to the SANS 2026 Threat Hunting Survey.

2. [2]

   Teams with working playbooks describe the logs as their ceiling, and gaps in cloud logging and identity telemetry come up most often.

3. [3]

   Gaps in the logs hurt most against the attackers respondents see most often, the ones who blend in with legitimate activity.

Read the original article →

What happened

Ariel Assaraf, CEO of Coralogix, says a system prompt can describe an AI-agent boundary but cannot enforce it. [1]

Assaraf describes building AI-agent guardrails at the execution layer and limiting context without expanding authority. [2]

He says controls are tuned by risk so agents remain useful during incidents. [2]

Why it matters

Assaraf describes tracking the consequences of agent actions rather than focusing only on what agents say; the supplied excerpt is truncated after this point. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   In this interview with Help Net Security, Ariel Assaraf, CEO of Coralogix, explains why a system prompt can describe a boundary for an AI agent but cannot enforce one.

2. [2]

   Assaraf covers how his team builds AI agent guardrails at the execution layer, limits context without expanding authority, and tunes controls by risk so agents stay useful during incidents.

3. [3]

   He describes how he tracks the consequences of agent actions, since an agent can return 200s and … More → The post Stop watching what AI agents say and start watching what they do appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

Dataiku announced Agent Management, a standalone product intended to discover an enterprise’s AI agents across platforms, measure their business and technical performance, and flag agents posing the greatest risk. [1]

Why it matters

The launch addresses a gap between the pace at which AI agents are created and adopted and organizations’ ability to observe and manage them. [2]

Known limitations

The supplied evidence does not describe Agent Management’s availability, deployment requirements, measurement methods, or risk criteria. [1] [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Dataiku has announced the launch of Agent Management, a standalone product that finds every AI agent an enterprise is running, regardless of which platform built it, measures the business and technical performance, and flags agents that pose the greatest risk.

2. [2]

   The launch addresses a disconnect between how fast agents are being created and adopted and organizations’ ability to observe and manage them.

Read the original article →

What happened

Abnormal AI announced additions to its AI Security suite for enterprise AI adoption and protection against threats created or accelerated by AI. [1]

The suite includes generally available Abnormal AI Governance and AI Cloud Security, which was previously announced in private preview. [2]

Three newly announced products are AI Employee Guardrails, AI Agent Security, and AI Security Workbench. [2]

Why it matters

The announcement positions the suite as combining governance, cloud security, and threat investigation for enterprises adopting AI across business functions. [1] [2] [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Abnormal AI has unveiled the newest additions to its AI Security suite, designed to help enterprises adopt AI securely while protecting against new threats created or accelerated by AI.

2. [2]

   The suite brings together Abnormal AI Governance, which is generally available, and AI Cloud Security, previously announced in private preview, with three newly announced products: AI Employee Guardrails, AI Agent Security, and AI Security Workbench.

3. [3]

   Enterprises are adopting AI across nearly every part of the business … More → The post Abnormal AI brings governance, cloud security, and threat investigation into one suite appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

Allure Security found an attacker offering fake desktop applications for three large U.S. payroll and HR platforms that had not released desktop applications. [1]

Running one of the installers installs ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote-access tool configured to let the attacker control the computer without the user’s knowledge. [2]

Why it matters

The reported campaign targets users of payroll and HR services and provides the attacker with remote control of an infected computer. [1] [2]

Known limitations

The evidence identifies the products as browser-accessed web applications, but does not name the three providers or describe the campaign’s scale, delivery channels, or confirmed access to payroll data. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   An attacker has been offering “desktop apps” for three large US payroll and HR platforms that have never released one, Allure Security have found.

2. [2]

   Anyone who runs the installer gets a copy of ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote access tool, configured to let the attacker control the computer without the user knowing.

3. [3]

   According to Ryan Merritt, Director of Security Research at Allure Security, all three providers deliver their products as web applications accessed through a browser, … More → The post Fake payroll desktop apps hand attackers a route to company paychecks appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

Docker announced Docker Cloud Sandboxes as a solution for secure, isolated AI-agent execution, allowing agentic workflows to continue running in the cloud after a developer’s laptop shuts down. [1]

The announced sandboxes are intended to let organizations run agentic workloads at scale without tying up developers’ hardware, provisioning their own infrastructure, or paying for unused capacity. [2]

Known limitations

The supplied evidence does not substantiate the article title’s claim about OCI-based Kits or explain how agents and guardrails are packaged. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Docker has announced Docker Cloud Sandboxes, a new solution for secure, isolated AI agent execution that enables complex agentic workflows to continue running in the cloud long after a developer’s laptop shuts down.

2. [2]

   Launched at WeAreDevelopers North America, Docker Cloud Sandboxes let organizations run agentic workloads at scale without tying up developers’ hardware, provisioning their own infrastructure, or paying for unused capacity.

3. [3]

   Docker Cloud Sandboxes give developers a straightforward path to move their agentic workflows … More → The post Docker introduces OCI-based Kits to package agents and their guardrails appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

Kaspersky reports that a new MacSync variant targets Mac users with an infostealer and persistent backdoor designed to steal credentials, cryptocurrency-wallet data, and files. [1]

Researchers found MacSync spreading through the Toria cryptocurrency-wallet app, which had its own website and was promoted on X and Telegram. [2]

MacSync is a Mac-malware family that emerged in 2025 as Mac.c and was later renamed. [3]

The supplied text states that early MacSync versions used AppleScripts resembling AMOS, but the sentence is truncated and does not provide further detail about the iCloud Calendar technique. [4]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   A new MacSync variant targets Mac users with an infostealer and persistent backdoor designed to steal credentials, crypto wallet data, and files, according to Kaspersky.

2. [2]

   Researchers found the malware spreading through a crypto wallet app called Toria, which had its own website and was promoted on X and Telegram.

3. [3]

   MacSync is a family of Mac malware that emerged in 2025 as Mac.c and was later renamed.

4. [4]

   Early versions used AppleScripts that closely resembled the AMOS … More → The post MacSync info-stealing malware hides malicious commands in an iCloud calendar appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

ShipmentsFree is described as a rebate service rather than a shipping company; its FAQ says members can claim up to $100 per month in shipping and return rebates if they submit proof of eligible costs. [1] [2]

The service is described as a paid, auto-renewing subscription under its Terms and Conditions. [3]

Why it matters

When checked, ShipmentsFree’s BBB profile listed 529 complaints from the previous three years, including 179 classified as billing issues; the source cautions that the BBB is not a regulator or court. [4] [5]

The article reports complaints describing recurring $25 charges that customers did not recall knowingly authorizing, including one complaint saying the customer did not understand they were enrolling in paid membership. [6] [7]

Related shipping-themed domains are reported to use ShipmentsFree or ShipmentFree branding, similar account pages, overlapping policy language, and shared support details. [8] [9]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   ShipmentsFree is a rebate service, not a shipping company.

2. [2]

   The ShipmentsFree FAQ says members can claim up to $100 per month in shipping and return rebates, provided they submit proof of the eligible costs.

3. [3]

   The service is also a paid, auto-renewing subscription, according to its Terms and Conditions .

4. [4]

   When we checked, ShipmentsFree’s BBB profile listed 529 complaints in the previous three years, including 179 classified as billing issues.

5. [5]

   The BBB is not a regulator or court, and complaint totals should be read with some caution.

6. [6]

   Several complaints describe a similar experience: Someone notices a recurring $25 charge, doesn’t recall knowingly signing up, and tries to work out where it came from.

7. [7]

   One complainant said they “did not understand” they were enrolling in a paid membership or authorizing the monthly charge.

8. [8]

   Related shipping-themed domains use ShipmentsFree or ShipmentFree branding, similar account pages, overlapping policy language, and shared support details.

9. [9]

   For example, freeshpmts.com and shipmentsfreezone.com both direct users to a “ShipmentFree – My Account” page, while shipmentsfreezone.com lists dataprotectionofficer@ shipmentsfree.com as its data protection contact.

Read the original article →

What happened

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security warned that a now-patched Roundcube Webmail vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild. [1]

CVE-2026-48842 is described as a CVSS 8.1 pre-authentication SQL injection in Roundcube Webmail’s virtuser_query plugin. [2]

The affected versions are Roundcube Webmail 1.6.x before 1.6.16 and 1.7.x before 1.7.1. [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has warned that a now-patched Roundcube Webmail vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild.

2. [2]

   The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-48842 (CVSS score: 8.1), a pre-authentication SQL injection in the virtuser_query plugin of Roundcube Webmail versions 1.6.x before 1.6.16 and 1.7.x before 1.7.1.

Read the original article →

What happened

Bitget said suspected North Korean threat actors stole $351.6 million from its hot and warm wallets. [1]

Bitget said its security systems identified unauthorized transfers involving a limited number of hot wallets at 18:31 UTC on September 24, 2026. [2]

Known limitations

The supplied evidence truncates Bitget’s statement about its cold wallets and most platform assets, so their status cannot be determined from these spans. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Cryptocurrency exchange Bitget said suspected North Korean threat actors have stolen $351.6 million from its hot and warm wallets.

2. [2]

   "At 18:31 UTC on September 24, 2026, Bitget's security systems identified unauthorized transfers involving a limited number of hot wallets," BitGet said in a post shared on X.

3. [3]

   "Bitget's cold wallets and the overwhelming majority of platform assets remain

Read the original article →

What happened

Anthropic published a report detailing detected Claude misuses; Daniel Meissler summarized it into 117 findings. [1] [2]

The report describes AI agents handling reconnaissance, exploitation, data theft, propaganda production, surveillance workflows, and research, while humans selected targets, set goals, and reviewed important outputs. [3]

Reported attackers used AI to industrialize credential theft, cloud compromise, phishing, vulnerability research, and sensitive-data extraction from downstream organizations. [4]

Influence operations used persistent agent memory, fake news sites, fabricated journalists, synthetic personas, political profiling, and multilingual content; high volume often produced little genuine engagement. [5]

Why it matters

Surveillance and repression cases included automated dossiers, biometric and communications analysis, transnational targeting, coercive recruitment, and systems that continued operating locally after model access was revoked. [6]

Known limitations

The report presents biological and weapons cases as dual-use risk, but generally does not establish completed biological weapons or operational battlefield deployment. [7]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Earlier this month, Anthropic published a long report detailing all of the Claude misuses it detected.

2. [2]

   Daniel Meissler usefully summarized the report into 117 findings.

3. [3]

   A few of the highlights: AI agents increasingly handled reconnaissance, exploitation, data theft, propaganda production, surveillance workflows, and research while humans selected targets, set goals, and reviewed important outputs.

4. [4]

   The report describes attackers using AI to industrialize credential theft, cloud compromise, phishing, vulnerability research, and the extraction of sensitive data from downstream organizations.

5. [5]

   Influence operations used persistent agent memory, fake news sites, fabricated journalists, synthetic personas, political profiling, and large-scale multilingual content, although high content volume often produced little genuine engagement.

6. [6]

   Surveillance and repression cases included automated dossiers, biometric and communications analysis, transnational targeting, coercive recruitment, and systems that continued operating locally after model access was revoked.

7. [7]

   Biological and weapons cases show dual-use risk: AI supported advanced scientific and military work, but the report generally doesn’t establish completed biological weapons or operational battlefield deployment.

Read the original article →

What happened

The source says AI has made failed cyberattacks cheap to retry, rather than necessarily creating an entirely new class of attack. [1] [2]

The described routine begins when an attacker gains access to a low-privilege cloud account and an initial privilege-escalation attempt fails. [3] [4]

Why it matters

The source contrasts the current cost of retrying a failed attack with the past cost, when a dead end could require hours of documentation reading. [2] [5]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Security leaders keep debating whether AI will produce an entirely new class of cyberattack.

2. [2]

   The nearer change is quieter and already visible: AI has made a failed attack cheap to retry.

3. [3]

   The routine version looks like this.

4. [4]

   An attacker lands on a low-privilege cloud account, and the first try at privilege escalation goes nowhere.

5. [5]

   That dead end used to cost hours of documentation reading,

Read the original article →

What happened

A detection rule may appear deployed on a coverage dashboard yet never fire when an attacker uses the technique it was designed to detect. [1]

Conifers assessed 14,652 detections across customer-written rules and vendor-managed detections in SIEM, endpoint, cloud, identity, email, and network tools. [2]

Why it matters

The research found that 47% of detections in the average organization need attention. [3]

Known limitations

The supplied evidence does not describe the five failure groups beyond naming them, so their specific causes cannot be summarized. [4]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   A detection rule can show up as deployed on a coverage dashboard and still never fire when an attacker uses the technique it was built to catch.

2. [2]

   Conifers assessed 14,652 detections in its customer base, including rules written by customers and detections managed by vendors in SIEM, endpoint, cloud, identity, email and network tools.

3. [3]

   The research found that 47% of detections in the average organization need attention.

4. [4]

   The failures fall into five groups Logic bugs … More → The post Threat detection dashboards are masking security coverage gaps appeared first on Help Net Security .

Read the original article →

What happened

Researchers at Manifold Security found third-party[.]com, an ordinary domain often used in documentation for an external website, API, or service, serving a fake Cloudflare-style verification page to Windows visitors. [1] [2] [3]

The page urged visitors to open the Windows Run box and paste a clipboard-copied command designed to download and execute a PowerShell script; the script-hosting domain was not resolving at the time of writing. [4] [5]

Because third-party[.]com was registered by someone else, documents, tests, and skills that hardcoded the domain could direct readers and users to attacker infrastructure. [2] [11] [12]

Why it matters

ClickFix is described as social engineering that convinces victims to run commands themselves, often using legitimate operating-system tools and the permissions of the persuaded user; consequences can range from information theft to more serious company-network compromise. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Another, third-party[.]com , has often been used in documentation to represent an external website, API, or service.

2. [2]

   However, there is a very important difference between the two: example.com is reserved for documentation, while third-party[.]com is an ordinary domain.

3. [3]

   Researchers at Manifold Security found that third-party[.]com was serving a fake Cloudflare-style verification page to Windows visitors.

4. [4]

   The page tries to persuade them to open the Windows Run box and paste a command it has copied to their clipboard.This command is designed to download and execute a PowerShell script.

5. [5]

   At the time of writing the domain hosting the script is not resolving.

6. [6]

   ClickFix is a social-engineering technique that turns the victim into the malware installer.

7. [7]

   Instead of relying on a malicious attachment or an obvious executable download, the attacker convinces someone to run a command themselves.

8. [8]

   ClickFix works because the command often uses legitimate Windows or Mac tools to download and execute the next stage.

9. [9]

   It also runs with the permissions of the person who has been convinced to enter it.

10. [10]

    The consequences can range from information theft to more serious compromise of a company network.

11. [11]

    Anyone could register it, and someone did.

12. [12]

    Every document, test, and skill that hardcoded it now points readers and users to the attacker’s infrastructure.

Read the original article →

What happened

Researchers reported a new PamStealer version in which the main payload can be recovered only through a server-side decryption chain. [1]

According to Jamf Threat Labs, the latest PamStealer artifacts retain the JXA dropper mechanism while changing the lure and delivery method. [2]

Known limitations

The supplied evidence does not specify how the earlier variants handled payload key material. [3]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new version of PamStealer that ensures that the main payload can only be recovered using a server-side decryption chain.

2. [2]

   The latest artifacts, per Jamf Threat Labs, continue to rely on the same JavaScript for Automation (JXA) dropper mechanism, but modify the lure and the delivery method.

3. [3]

   "Where earlier variants embedded their payload key material

Read the original article →

What happened

Attackers compromised legitimate Ukrainian business websites, injected hidden iframes, and displayed fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages to deliver Psychedelic Stealer. [1] [2] [3]

The campaign uses a ClickFix-style flow: clicking the fake CAPTCHA copies a Windows Installer command, then instructs the visitor to press Windows+R, paste it, and press Enter. [4] [5] [6] [7]

The downloaded MSI installs psychedeliclove.exe, which targets saved browser passwords, browser account tokens, and cryptocurrency wallets. [8] [9] [10]

Why it matters

After installation, the malware establishes persistence, profiles the host, polls command-and-control infrastructure, and supports additional EXE, COM, BAT, CMD, MSI, and PowerShell payloads. [11] [12] [13]

The lure appeared on trusted-looking business websites, which the source says could make the fake CAPTCHA harder for visitors to recognize. [14] [15] [16] [17]

At collection time, the management panel recorded 557 views, 426 clicks, and 79 complete events across 32 countries; Ukraine accounted for 446 views and 351 clicks. [18] [19]

Known limitations

The panel labeled complete events as executions, but the report says they confirm only that a user clicked Done in the browser, not that the command was run or the host was compromised. [20] [21]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Attackers hijacked Ukrainian websites to deliver a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA that installs Psychedelic Stealer and steals browser and crypto credentials.

2. [2]

   Psychedelic Stealer is being distributed through compromised Ukrainian business websites.

3. [3]

   Attackers injected hidden iframes into legitimate pages and used them to display a fake Cloudflare verification screen to visitors.

4. [4]

   When the victim clicks the fake CAPTCHA, the page silently copies a Windows Installer command to the clipboard.

5. [5]

   It then tells the user to press Windows+R, paste the command and press Enter.

6. [6]

   Instead, the command directly launches msiexec.exe .

7. [7]

   It also includes the fake Cloudflare verification text, making the command in the Run window look like part of the verification process.

8. [8]

   The downloaded MSI file then installs a 64-bit executable called psychedeliclove.exe , which Arctic Wolf Labs tracks as Psychedelic Stealer.

9. [9]

   The malware targets saved passwords from browsers such as Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi and Yandex.

10. [10]

    It also steals browser account tokens and targets cryptocurrency wallets, including Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Electrum, Bitcoin Core and Litecoin Core.

11. [11]

    Beyond the one-time credential grab, the implant installs browser components and sets up a native messaging bridge that lets deployed browser content communicate with a local process on the machine.

12. [12]

    It creates a scheduled task for persistence named psychedelicloveUtils, profiles the host in detail including antivirus status and installed browsers, and then starts polling its command-and-control server for additional tasks.

13. [13]

    As Arctic Wolf Labs puts it: “The implant tracks task state in executed_tasks.json, downloads attachments into downloads\<taskid>_<filename>, and supports EXE, COM, BAT, CMD, MSI, and PowerShell files.” states the report.

14. [14]

    These were legitimate businesses with established social media profiles and third-party listings.

15. [15]

    Visitors were therefore directed to a trusted website they may have visited before, making the fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA harder to recognize.

16. [16]

    Visitors didn’t stumble onto an obvious fake domain.

17. [17]

    They landed on a site they may have visited before, for a business they already had some reason to trust, and got served a fake CAPTCHA instead of the page they were looking for.

18. [18]

    At collection time the panel showed 557 views, 426 clicks, and 79 complete events across 32 countries.

19. [19]

    Ukraine accounted for 446 of those views and 351 of the clicks, which combined with Ukrainian-language instructions and Ukrainian business websites makes the targeting intent about as clear as it gets.

20. [20]

    The Done button remains disabled for about 35 seconds after the command is copied.

21. [21]

    The panel labeled its complete events as “executions” and calculated a conversion rate from them, which Arctic Wolf correctly points out overstates actual confirmed compromises, since a complete event only means someone clicked Done in the browser, not that they ran anything.

Read the original article →

What happened

Two actions-cool GitHub Actions were disabled again after becoming accessible the previous week; the repositories had been compromised during the May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud campaign. [1]

The affected Actions are actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment. [2]

Known limitations

The supplied evidence is truncated and does not establish what malware execution occurred after the repositories returned online or why access was restored. [1] [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Two actions-cool GitHub Actions have been disabled for a second time after the repositories became accessible last week, months after they were compromised during the May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.

2. [2]

   The affected GitHub Actions are listed below - actions-cool/issues-helper actions-cool/maintain-one-comment Visiting either of the repositories now shows the message: "Access to this

Read the original article →

What happened

The Register is hosting a private New York dinner on Tuesday 27 October for senior technology, infrastructure and data leaders, with LucidLink; Joe Fay moderates under the Chatham House Rule. [1] [2] [3] [4]

The discussion concerns how distributed teams handle unstructured data using legacy NAS, VPNs, sync and download workflows, including duplicated storage, waiting, governance gaps and file-version uncertainty. [5] [6] [7]

The event is framed around modernizing around existing storage and governance investments rather than a rip-and-replace approach. [8] [9]

The dinner is scheduled for 6:00pm–8:30pm at The Capital Grille, 120 W 51st Street, and includes Holly Bossert of LucidLink. [10] [11]

Why it matters

Topics include supporting distributed teams without paying for the same file three times, sync and version control, and whether the approach withstands a security incident. [7]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   EVENT: The Register is hosting a private dinner in New York on Tuesday 27 October for senior technology, infrastructure and data leaders, with LucidLink.

2. [2]

   Joe Fay takes the chair, it runs under the Chatham House Rule, and nothing said leaves the table.

3. [3]

   Joe Fay of The Register moderates.

4. [4]

   The table is for senior technology, infrastructure and data leaders carrying this now, not planning for it later.

5. [5]

   Distributed teams are producing more unstructured file data than ever, and most of them reach it through infrastructure designed for an office: legacy NAS, a VPN, and a sync-and-download habit nobody actually chose.

6. [6]

   It charges rent somewhere else instead, in duplicated storage, in waiting, in governance gaps, and in the hour somebody loses working out which version of a file is current.

7. [7]

   On the table: handling the growth in unstructured data, supporting distributed teams without paying for the same file three times, sync and version control, and whether any of it holds up against a security incident.

8. [8]

   The premise is deliberately not rip and replace.

9. [9]

   The evening is about modernizing around the storage and governance investments an organization already has, rather than pretending they are not there, which is usually the point at which these conversations stop being useful to the people who have to pay for them.

10. [10]

    Holly Bossert, Commercial Sales US at LucidLink, joins the conversation.

11. [11]

    Dinner runs from 6.00pm to 8.30pm at The Capital Grille, 120 W 51st Street.

Read the original article →

What happened

LinkedIn is adding verification features intended to make fabricated professional identities, work histories, and company impersonation harder, in response to generative AI lowering the cost of creating convincing profiles and outreach. [1] [2] [3]

The features include colleague or classmate confirmations of work or study affiliations; these confirm an affiliation but do not assess ability or recommend the person. [4] [5] [6]

Admins of verified company Pages can remove falsely affiliated people from associated-people listings and search results, but cannot remove the person’s profile or erase the claim from it. [7] [8]

LinkedIn is testing workplace verification for people associating themselves with a company Page, potentially using a work email address, and is extending LinkedIn-verified identity partnerships beyond LinkedIn. [9] [10] [11]

Why it matters

The checks may help establish whether a recruiter is affiliated with a recognized company, but may be less useful when scammers invent the employer itself or operate a fraudulent company Page. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]

Source-supported guidance

The source advises checking a recruiter’s affiliation independently, visiting the employer’s website, and matching its contact details and job listing against the opportunity. [21]

Known limitations

The source characterizes verification as a useful signal rather than a guarantee and warns that criminals could exploit verified accounts, manipulated verification, or fraudulent profile networks. [17] [18] [19] [20]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   LinkedIn is adding trust and verification features aimed at making fake professional identities, invented work histories, and company impersonation harder to pull off.

2. [2]

   The company is responding to an environment in which generative AI enables imposters to create an entirely made-up professional persona.

3. [3]

   It reduces the cost of creating convincing headshots, biographies, résumés, outreach messages, and recommendations.

4. [4]

   LinkedIn’s new features use verified people and company Pages to help check other users’ claims.

5. [5]

   Colleague and classmate vouching: People can confirm that they worked or studied with someone during the period listed on that person’s profile.

6. [6]

   This confirms an affiliation; it does not rate the person’s ability or recommend them.

7. [7]

   Employer control over false affiliations: Admins of verified company Pages can remove people who falsely claim to work there from the company’s associated people and search results.

8. [8]

   This doesn’t remove the person’s profile or erase the claim from it.

9. [9]

   Workplace verification requirement (in testing): LinkedIn is testing a setting that would require people who want to associate themselves with a company Page to verify their workplace, for example, through a work email address.

10. [10]

    Verified identity beyond LinkedIn: LinkedIn is extending partnerships that let users display their LinkedIn-verified identity elsewhere.

11. [11]

    New partners include Truecaller and PeerSpot, alongside Adobe and UserTesting.

12. [12]

    A scammer does not always need to impersonate a major employer.

13. [13]

    They can invent a convincing startup, build a polished company Page, and use fake job listings or recruiters to lure applicants.

14. [14]

    The checks may be less helpful if the supposed employer itself is part of the scam.

15. [15]

    The new checks may help someone determine whether a supposed recruiter is affiliated with a company they recognize.

16. [16]

    They may be less helpful when the company itself is part of the scam.

17. [17]

    Verification is therefore a useful signal, not a guarantee.

18. [18]

    Verified accounts, workplace affiliations, and colleague confirmations may become more valuable to criminals, too.

19. [19]

    They may try to exploit those signals through stolen accounts, manipulated verification, or carefully constructed networks of fraudulent profiles.

20. [20]

    Verification can raise the cost of deception, but it cannot replace healthy skepticism.

21. [21]

    Check a recruiter’s affiliation, visit the employer’s website independently, and confirm that its contact details and job listing match.

Read the original article →

What happened

Bitget’s CEO confirmed a cyberattack bearing hallmarks of a North Korean operation stole approximately $387.5 million in digital assets from exchange wallets. [1]

Bitget revised its estimated loss from $351.6 million to $387.5 million after identifying additional affected assets on Zcash and TRON. [2]

Bitget said its security team identified the wallet service’s backend as the source of unauthorized transfers, with attackers forging transfer information and invoking the authorization-signing process. [4] [5]

Bitget said private-key leakage had been ruled out and that damage control was complete, with no further fund outflows from the platform expected; intrusion methods remained under investigation. [6] [7] [8]

Why it matters

Arkham estimated that about $228 million left Bitget wallets within 18 minutes, from 18:58 to 19:16 UTC; its preliminary total was roughly $350 million. [3]

Bitget said cold wallets and customer balances were unaffected, its User Protection Fund held more than $464 million, and user funds were covered on a 1:1 basis. [9] [10]

Known limitations

Bitget engaged Mandiant and SlowMist to investigate, while its full report was to be released after the technical investigation concluded. [8] [11]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   The CEO of crypto exchange Bitget has confirmed that a cyberattack with all the hallmarks of a North Korean operation resulted in approximately $387.5 million worth of digital assets being stolen from the exchange’s wallets.

2. [2]

   Bitget initially estimated the loss at $351.6 million, but later revised the figure to $387.5 million after identifying additional affected assets on Zcash and TRON that were not included in the initial estimate.

3. [3]

   Blockchain intelligence company Arkham published its preliminary observations of the attack, estimating at the time that roughly $350 million was stolen and that $228 million left Bitget’s wallets in 18 minutes, between 18:58 and 19:16 UTC.

4. [4]

   How and who Root cause analyses typically take some time, although according to Chen, Bitget's security team has already identified the wallet service's backend system as the source of the unauthorized transfers.

5. [5]

   “Hackers breached a key backend system of the wallet service and exploited it to forge transfer information and invoke the authorization signing process, thereby transferring funds out,” she said.

6. [6]

   “The possibility of private key leakage can be ruled out – this means a more severe risk scenario has been eliminated.

7. [7]

   Damage control has been confirmed as complete, and there is no risk of further fund outflows from the platform.

8. [8]

   “The specific intrusion methods used by the hackers are still under technical investigation, and a full report will be released upon completion of the investigation.” Chen did not go into too much detail about the alleged links to North Korean state-sponsored attackers having a hand in the attack, but said “IP behavioral patterns and on-chain signatures” suggest it was Kim’s cronies at work.

9. [9]

   However, Chen said Bitget's cold wallets and customer balances remained unaffected, while its User Protection Fund held more than $464 million worth of assets.

10. [10]

    “User funds are covered on a 1:1 basis.” Chen also explained that Bitget Wallet, the company’s self-custody product, operates on infrastructure separate from its exchange, and Bitget users can still make deposits and trade their tokens, despite withdrawals being temporarily suspended while additional security checks are completed.

11. [11]

    Bitget said it also engaged incident response giant Mandiant and blockchain security outfit SlowMist to help with the investigation into the attack.

Read the original article →

What happened

Allure Security reported a campaign impersonating three unnamed US-based HR and payroll platforms with fake Windows desktop clients; those providers do not offer desktop apps. [1] [2] [3] [4]

When executed, the fake installer displays a Microsoft installer and installs .NET Desktop Runtime 8.0.26 while silently installing legitimate ConnectWise ScreenConnect software. [5] [6] [7]

Why it matters

ScreenConnect is configured for unattended access, with victim-facing indicators disabled, launch at boot, and persistence across user sessions, providing a quiet interactive foothold. [8] [9]

The campaign uses legitimate-looking infrastructure, including an AI-built site hosted on Vercel and downloads hosted through GitHub Releases, which can obscure the malicious activity. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

Known limitations

The number of victims is unknown: the three fake downloads had 291 total downloads at the time of the report, but the count included researchers and possibly sandboxes. [15] [16] [17]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Cybersecurity outfit Allure Security reported the discovery of the campaign Thursday, describing it as the latest evolution in a trend of abusing ScreenConnect and other remote monitoring and management software.

2. [2]

   This time, the main giveaway is knowing what the vendors actually sell: None offers the Windows app being advertised.

3. [3]

   According to Allure, the campaign impersonates three unnamed US-based HR and payroll platforms by offering fake desktop clients for those providers’ software.

4. [4]

   In all three cases, those companies don’t offer a desktop client, meaning all it takes is an unaware HR or payroll clerk tricked by promises of superior performance to potentially expose some incredibly sensitive company data.

5. [5]

   Once downloaded and executed, the installer presents the victim with an actual Microsoft installer to make it appear like a legitimate piece of software.

6. [6]

   It actually installs the Microsoft .NET Desktop Runtime 8.0.26, so it goes through the entire process and shows that an installation completes, but nothing ever pops up, leaving the victim unclear as to where their desktop app went.

7. [7]

   That’s not all the installer is doing, of course: It’s also running a quiet, no-interface installer to drop the ScreenConnect client on the victim’s machine.

8. [8]

   “The [ScreenConnect] access mode is set to unattended,” Allure notes.

9. [9]

   “The victim-facing indicators are turned off: no ‘your machine is being controlled’ banner, no system-tray icon, no connection balloon.” The silent install is also configured to launch on boot, and stay connected across various user sessions, giving the attacker “a quiet, persistent, interactive foothold,” says Allure.

10. [10]

    Clicking through to the website offering the fake app brings up a legitimate-looking site built using AI app builder Lovable and hosted on Vercel.

11. [11]

    The site is hidden behind the cloud host’s bot challenge page, meaning scrapers haven’t been able to index it and expose the scam.

12. [12]

    Further obscuring the malicious nature of the campaign, the downloads are hosted on a GitHub Releases page, meaning they point to a trusted domain.

13. [13]

    “Nothing in this chain is malware in the usual sense,” the infosec outfit said.

14. [14]

    The thing that was installed is a legitimate RMM product, doing what it was designed to do, for someone who was never supposed to have it.” In other words, security teams have some work to do before they even check the indicators of compromise that Allure included in its report: Check with HR and payroll vendors to see if they offer a desktop app, and if not alert all members of those teams to this campaign.

15. [15]

    For those hoping they haven’t fallen victim, the actual number of victims remains unknown.

16. [16]

    Allure said the GitHub download counts across the three fake downloads totaled 291 as of its report.

17. [17]

    Some of those came from Allure’s researchers, and possibly other researchers and sandboxes too, so the download count can’t be used to determine how many victims there are.

Read the original article →

What happened

The Supreme Court ruled that states may use the federal SAVE database to verify voter citizenship, reversing lower-court decisions that found the database inaccurate and likely to disenfranchise eligible voters. [1]

DHS originally designed SAVE for immigrant benefit eligibility and citizenship-applicant tracking; the Trump administration repurposed it to screen voters for citizenship. [2] [3] [4]

Voting-rights groups argued that combining SAVE data with Social Security records violated confidentiality provisions in the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. [11] [12]

The article reports that DHS did not create a legally mandated system-of-records notice for SAVE or offer a public-comment period before announcing in May 2025 that the database was ready for use. [13] [14] [15] [16]

Why it matters

Critics characterize SAVE as outdated and often inaccurate, with a significant risk of wrongly removing eligible voters from rolls; DHS admits its data is not perfect and evidence suggests significant flaws. [5] [6]

Although the ruling permits use of SAVE, adoption remains uncertain: some conservative states have used it, while most states have resisted federal citizenship-verification efforts or federal control of voter-registration work. [7] [8] [9]

Election experts said the ruling’s impact on 2026 is likely limited because federal law bars states from changing voter registration within 90 days of an election. [10]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Supreme Court ruled Friday that states may use the federal SAVE database to verify voter citizenship, reversing lower court decisions that found the database was inaccurate and would likely disenfranchise eligible voters.

2. [2]

   “Under these circumstances, the equities weigh in favor of a stay.” The Department of Homeland Security initially designed the SAVE database to determine benefit eligibility for immigrants and to track applicants pursuing U.S.

3. [3]

   citizenship.

4. [4]

   Under the Trump administration, it had been repurposed to screen voters for citizenship.

5. [5]

   Critics say the tool is outdated, often inaccurate and poses a significant risk of wrongly removing eligible voters from rolls.

6. [6]

   “Given that the SAVE system is used purely as a voluntary system to assist states in keeping their voter lists accurate, states may find this to be a helpful tool to use alongside other mechanisms to keep their lists up to date, even as the Department of Homeland Security itself admits the data is not perfect and evidence suggests the SAVE system has significant flaws,” said David Becker, executive director of the nonprofit Center for Election Innovation and Research.

7. [7]

   While the ruling permits states to use the database, adoption remains uncertain.

8. [8]

   Some conservative states have used SAVE previously, saying it has been helpful in maintaining voter rolls.

9. [9]

   However, most states have resisted the federal government’s efforts to use citizenship verification systems or wrest control of voter registration efforts away from states.

10. [10]

    Election experts said that the ruling’s impact on 2026 is likely to be limited because of federal laws that bar states from making changes to voter registration within 90 days of an election.

11. [11]

    Voting rights groups, including the League of Women Voters and the Electronic Privacy Information Center, filed suit last year.

12. [12]

    They argued that combining SAVE data with Social Security records violated confidentiality provisions in the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedures Act.

13. [13]

    Three justices – Ketanji Brown Jackson, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan – dissented, noting that “without full briefing or oral argument, this Court now grants [a stay]—rendering questionable interim rulings about two statutory provisions it has never before interpreted.” There are laws and procedures that govern how and when federal systems are changed or modified.

14. [14]

    In this case, DHS did not create a legally mandated system of records notice (SORN) for the SAVE database outlining the broader impacts of the changes on data privacy.

15. [15]

    Nor did they engage in or offer a public comment period.

16. [16]

    Instead, they simply announced in May 2025 that the database was ready for use.

Read the original article →

What happened

Bitget says suspected North Korea-linked actors stole $351.6 million from a limited number of hot and warm wallets. [1] [2]

Bitget detected unauthorized transfers on September 24, 2026, involving hot wallets, and temporarily suspended withdrawals while an investigation began. [3] [4] [5]

Bitget says the attacker compromised a critical backend wallet-infrastructure system, spoofed transaction data, and triggered the authorization process; the account says the breach affected ETH, XRP, BNB, AVAX, USDT, and USDC across several blockchains. [6] [7] [8]

Mandiant and SlowMist are investigating; Bitget says affected blockchain foundations were contacted and some froze hacker wallet addresses. [10] [13] [14] [15]

Why it matters

Bitget says customer balances, cold wallets, and most platform assets remain secure, while deposits and trading continue normally. [9] [10]

Bitget says its self-custodial Bitget Wallet uses separate infrastructure and was not affected; users’ assets remain onchain under their control. [11] [12]

Known limitations

Bitget characterizes the attack method as highly consistent with known North Korean hacker-organization patterns, based on IP behavior and on-chain analysis; the attribution remains presented as suspected. [1] [16]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Bitget says suspected North Korea-linked actors stole $351.6M from hot and warm wallets.

2. [2]

   Cryptocurrency exchange Bitget says suspected North Korea-linked threat actors stole $351.6 million from a limited number of hot and warm wallets.

3. [3]

   The company detected unauthorized transfers on September 24 and temporarily suspended withdrawals.

4. [4]

   At 18:31 UTC on September 24, 2026, Bitget’s security systems identified unauthorized transfers involving a limited number of hot wallets.

5. [5]

   Our security team immediately activated emergency response procedures and began a full investigation.

6. [6]

   Bitget… — Bitget (@bitget) September 25, 2026 Bitget CEO Gracy Chen said the security breach affected ETH, XRP, BNB, AVAX, USDT and USDC across several blockchains.

7. [7]

   The attacker reportedly compromised a backend wallet system, spoofed transaction data and bypassed the authorization process to move funds.

8. [8]

   The attacker compromised a critical backend system within our wallet infrastructure, used it to spoof transaction data, and triggered our authorization… https://t.co/5nINjwbXpC — Gracy Chen @Bitget (@GracyBitget) September 25, 2026 Bitget is a cryptocurrency exchange and Web3 company founded in 2018.

9. [9]

   Based on our current assessment,… https://t.co/7xF5xW0JQ1 — Bitget (@bitget) September 24, 2026 Bitget said customer balances, cold wallets and most platform assets remain secure.

10. [10]

    Mandiant and SlowMist are investigating the incident, while deposits and trading continue normally.

11. [11]

    “Bitget Wallet operates as a self-custodial wallet on a completely separate and independent infrastructure from Bitget Exchange and was not affected by this incident.

12. [12]

    Bitget Wallet users’ assets remain onchain under users’ control and remain unaffected.” [UPDATES] We are currently working with independent third-party experts Mandiant and SlowMist for a full investigation.

13. [13]

    “We are currently working with independent third-party experts Mandiant and SlowMist for a full investigation.

14. [14]

    Bitget said affected blockchain foundations were contacted and some have frozen hacker wallets.

15. [15]

    “We have contacted the foundations of all affected chains, and some foundations have confirmed the freezing of hacker wallet addresses,” Chen explained .

16. [16]

    “Based on IP behavior patterns and on-chain analysis, the attack method in this incident is highly consistent with known patterns of North Korean hacker organizations.” Here is what we can confirm at this stage: On the attack: Our security team has made initial progress in tracing the source.

Read the original article →

What happened

A Telegram recruiter sought callers for an apparent Google Security Team voice-phishing scam, requiring applicants not to read scripts while printing the script in the same advertisement. [1] [2]

The advertised script impersonated Google Account Security and opened by claiming the call was on a recorded line. [2]

Trellix said its Dark Web Roast was intended to avoid glorifying threat actors and to encourage debate about how the industry should address criminal activity. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]

Why it matters

Trellix described the incident as real criminal activity causing significant harm, despite presenting it in a satirical Dark Web Roast. [3] [4]

The article reports that English-language social engineering is highly sought on underground forums and that related job advertisements more than doubled between 2024 and 2025. [5] [6]

According to Google, voice phishing became the second most common method for gaining initial access to victims’ IT estates and the leading tactic for breaking into cloud environments. [7] [8]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   A Telegram user recruiting callers to work in an apparent Google Security Team voice-phishing scam told applicants that they weren’t allowed to read from scripts – in the same ad that also included the exact script they had to read during these scam calls.

2. [2]

   “Hiring - Female/Male Mail Callers,” the advertisement said, seeking “USA/CA (white sounding)” applicants and, in bold, “NO SCRIPT READING.” The ad then proceeded to print the exact script the callers would read: “Good afternoon, this is [name] reaching you on behalf of the Google Account Security Team on a recorded line.

3. [3]

   This and other true-crime tales of criminals making fools of themselves appear in the latest installment of the Trellix Advanced Research Center’s Dark Web Roast, which uses memes and mockery to troll criminals on the dark web.

4. [4]

   It also acknowledges: “While these incidents are genuinely amusing, they represent real criminal activities causing significant harm.” One of these incidents from August involves a Telegram user identified by Trellix as Derian (@crɑick) who posted an ad in the UK Fraudsters Telegram channel.

5. [5]

   They don't have superpowers." The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) recently reported its most damaging year for internet scams, with 2025’s data pegging reported losses at $20.87 billion, and English-language social engineering is among the most in-demand skill sets on underground forums.

6. [6]

   One report by threat detection and response firm ReliaQuest found the number of job advertisements posted on criminal marketplaces mentioning this particular talent more than doubled between 2024 and 2025.

7. [7]

   Plus, according to Google, voice phishing surged last year to become the second most common method used by cybercriminals to gain initial access to their victims' IT estate – and the No.

8. [8]

   1 tactic used when breaking into cloud environments.

9. [9]

   The Register previously spoke with Trellix VP of threat intelligence strategy John Fokker about the Dark Web Roast, and he said the idea came from a desire to take an "almost psyops" approach to covering the criminal underground.

10. [10]

    "We don't want to glorify them, what's the opposite we can do?

11. [11]

    We're going to roast them," Fokker told us during a conversation at RSAC.

12. [12]

    "I'm trying to spark a debate, or a healthy conversation, about what we can do as an industry," he said.

13. [13]

    "Everybody's glorifying threat actors, and that's not helping our customers or organizations.

Read the original article →

What happened

Researchers reported Google ads delivering a tech-support scam that froze Windows and Mac screens and instructed users to call a bogus call center. [1]

The ads appeared across high-traffic maps, weather, real-estate, document-hosting, and sports websites. [2]

Why it matters

Callers were urged to pay substantial fees, provide remote access to their devices, or disclose personal information. [3]

Netskope observed users from 619 customer organizations click the malicious ads between August 31 and September 14, but said none were scammed because it blocked the content. [4]

Netskope tracked more than 250 Google Ads campaign IDs across at least 284 legitimate publisher sites. [5]

Known limitations

The reported exposure count is limited by Netskope’s visibility into only a small portion of internet activity, and the source says the true number exposed or victimized was likely higher. [6]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Researchers say they recently found Google ads delivering a sophisticated tech support scam that freezes the screens of both Windows and Mac devices and displays messages urgently instructing them to phone a bogus call center.

2. [2]

   The ads were displayed all over the web, including on high-traffic maps, weather, real-estate, document-hosting, and sports sites.

3. [3]

   Users who called the number were then urged to pay hefty fees, grant remote access to their devices, or divulge personal information.

4. [4]

   From August 31 to September 14, security firm Netskope observed users from 619 customer organizations click on the malicious ads, although none of them were actually scammed because Netskope blocked the content.

5. [5]

   Netskope tracked more than 250 Google Ads campaign IDs across at least 284 legitimate publisher sites.

6. [6]

   Since the firm has visibility into only a tiny sliver of Internet activity, the number of people exposed to the ads—including those who fell victim to it—is likely much higher.

Read the original article →

What happened

The Hands-On Science Center is hosting a hands-on Family Squid Dissection for families and curious learners of all ages. [1] [2]

The experience combines an interactive lesson with examination of a real squid’s organs, structures, and specialized features. [2] [3]

Why it matters

The activity is presented as a way for children and adults to examine how squid anatomy supports survival in an underwater environment. [4]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   I feel like someone who reads this blog will want to go to this : Families are invited to dive into the fascinating world of marine biology during an exciting, hands-on Family Squid Dissection at the Hands-On Science Center.

2. [2]

   Designed for curious learners of all ages, this unique experience combines an interactive lesson with the opportunity to explore the anatomy and adaptations of real ocean life.

3. [3]

   […] During the guided squid dissection, each family will work together to examine a squid up close, exploring its organs, structures, and specialized features.

4. [4]

   The experience provides a memorable opportunity for children and adults to see firsthand how the anatomy of a squid helps it survive in its underwater environment.

Read the original article →

What happened

A former Army soldier, Cameron John Wagenius, was sentenced to 70 months in prison after pleading guilty to a cybercrime campaign involving attacks and extortion attempts against telecom companies and other organizations. [1] [2] [3]

Wagenius and co-conspirators stole credentials, accessed cloud platforms used by AT&T and other companies, and attempted to extort more than 10 organizations. [4]

AT&T confirmed that cybercriminals accessed its Snowflake environment and stole six months of phone and text records belonging to nearly all customers; researchers said some records found in Wagenius’ possession came from Snowflake customer databases. [7] [8]

Officials said Wagenius used SSH Brute, a hacking tool he helped develop, to steal credentials while on active duty, and used VPN software to hide his identity and location while operating from barracks at Fort Cavazos. [9] [10]

Before his arrest, Wagenius attempted to sell stolen sensitive data to a foreign intelligence service and sought information online about defecting to Russia. [11]

Wagenius was ordered to pay nearly $295,000 in restitution; officials said he was directly involved in attempted extortion targeting multiple organizations for more than $1 million combined. [13] [14]

Why it matters

The victims included AT&T, Ticketmaster, Advance Auto Parts and Santander; prosecutors said the group stole billions of sensitive records and received more than $2.5 million in combined extortion payments. [5] [6]

Authorities said Wagenius disclosed non-content call-detail records belonging to a government official and family members of another former official, and separately reported that he leaked stolen call records of President Donald Trump during failed AT&T extortion attempts. [3] [12]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   A former Army soldier responsible for a series of attacks and extortion attempts on telecom companies, including AT&T, was sentenced to 70 months in prison , the Justice Department said Friday.

2. [2]

   Cameron John Wagenius engaged in a cybercrime spree for years, including while he was on active duty on a base in Texas.

3. [3]

   Wagenius, who pleaded guilty in July 2025, leaked stolen call records of President Donald Trump as part of multiple failed attempts to extort $500,000 from AT&T, Allison Nixon, chief research officer at Unit 221B, previously told CyberScoop.

4. [4]

   Wagenius’ and one of his co-conspirators, Connor Moucka, attempted to extort more than 10 organizations after stealing credentials and breaking into cloud platforms used by AT&T and other major companies based in the United States and abroad.

5. [5]

   custody, stole billions of sensitive records and received more than $2.5 million in extortion payments combined, according to prosecutors.

6. [6]

   Victims of the attack spree included AT&T , Ticketmaster , Advance Auto Parts and Santander.

7. [7]

   AT&T in July confirmed cybercriminals accessed the company’s Snowflake environment in April and stole six months of phone and text records of “nearly all” of its customers .

8. [8]

   Some of the records in Wagenius’ possession at the time of his arrest were stolen in the attack spree on Snowflake customer databases, according to cybercrime researchers.

9. [9]

   “This sentence must impose real consequences to deter him, and hopefully other would-be hackers.” Wagenius, who identified himself as “kiberphant0m” and “cyb3rph4nt0m” on online criminal forums, used a hacking tool he helped develop called SSH Brute to steal credentials while on active duty, officials said.

10. [10]

    Days later, Wagenius purchased a new laptop against his commanding officer’s order, according to officials, and used it every day over a five-day period in the barracks at Fort Cavazos in Texas with VPN software to hide his identity and location.

11. [11]

    Prior to his arrest in December 2024, Wagenius attempted to sell stolen sensitive data to a foreign intelligence service and sought information online about defecting to Russia.

12. [12]

    Authorities did not name Wagenius’ alleged victims in court filings, but said he disclosed non-content call detail records belonging to a government official and family members of another former official.

13. [13]

    Officials said Wagenius was directly involved in attempted extortion attempts targeting multiple organizations for a combined total of more than $1 million.

14. [14]

    The 22-year-old was ordered to pay almost $295,000 in restitution for his crimes.

Read the original article →

What happened

Cameron John Wagenius, a U.S. Army soldier stationed in South Korea, pleaded guilty to hacking telecommunications companies and stealing mobile call and text metadata from more than 100 million AT&T customers; he was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison and ordered to pay $294,978 in restitution. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

The intrusions involved Snowflake customers with exposed credentials and no enforced multi-factor authentication; Snowflake has since mandated MFA on all accounts. [3]

Wagenius claimed to have compromised more than a dozen telecommunications companies worldwide, including Verizon’s Push-to-Talk business, and publicly extorted them over threatened publication of stolen data. [7]

While awaiting sentencing, Wagenius violated Bureau of Prisons computer-use policies by seeking information about Windows 10 privilege-escalation CVEs, a D-Link command-injection vulnerability, antenna construction, and escaping prison. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]

Despite the scale of the stolen data, prosecutors said Wagenius’s extortion efforts produced about $1,500 in total proceeds, while causing significant harm to individuals, companies, and the U.S. government. [19] [20] [21] [22] [23]

Why it matters

Federal investigators characterized the case as a serious insider-threat investigation because Wagenius was an active-duty soldier with secret clearance allegedly creating hacking tools and trafficking in data. [8] [9] [10]

Prosecutors said Wagenius framed several AI requests as research for a book and described this as a common prompt-injection method intended to obtain malicious exploit code despite safeguards. [17] [18]

Known limitations

The government said it was unaware of evidence that Wagenius had learned how to use or deploy vulnerabilities in Bureau of Prisons systems; he said he was researching potential vulnerabilities for the BOP. [19]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

1. [1]

   Army soldier who pleaded guilty to hacking into multiple telecommunications companies and stealing mobile call and text metadata for more than 100 million AT&T customers in 2024 was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison today and ordered to pay nearly $300,000 in restitution to victims.

2. [2]

   Cameron John Wagenius , 22, was stationed at a U.S.

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   Army base in South Korea when he adopted the cybercriminal persona “ Kiberphant0m .” Working with three alleged co-conspirators, Kiberphant0m downloaded data from several large customers of the cloud data storage service Snowflake that had exposed credentials and did not enforce multi-factor authentication (Snowflake has since mandated MFA on all accounts).

4. [4]

   source and destination number, timestamp, duration, etc.) for tens of millions of AT&T customers.

5. [5]

   Less than a month later, Wagenius was arrested and charged in two separate federal indictments, and soon pleaded guilty to all counts in both cases.

6. [6]

   At his sentencing hearing in Seattle today, Wagenius was sentenced to nearly six years in federal prison, and ordered to pay $294,978 in restitution.

7. [7]

   Kiberphant0m claimed to have hacked into more than dozen telecommunications companies worldwide, including Verizon’s Push-to-Talk business, and publicly extorted these companies in exchange for a promise not to publish the stolen data.

8. [8]

   Russell said when DCIS received information that a soldier with secret clearance was allegedly involved in cybercrime and extortion, the agency began working the investigation alongside the FBI, the Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID), and the U.S.

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   “We don’t often get leads where there’s an active duty soldier with a secret clearance who’s creating hacking tools and trafficking in data,” Russell said.

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    It was very serious from jump street, just because it was unique, it was an insider threat, and we weren’t sure what we were dealing with.” A sentencing memo (PDF) filed Sept.

11. [11]

    19 by federal prosecutors in Seattle notes that while Wagenius pleaded guilty almost immediately and has been remarkably cooperative, he recently got caught trying to find security vulnerabilities in the BOP’s computer network.

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    The government’s memo notes that while incarcerated and awaiting sentencing, Wagenius violated the computer use policies of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in attempts to learn about vulnerabilities in BOP computer systems.

13. [13]

    “According to records from BOP, in or around September 2025, Wagenius used another inmate’s email system to request that the email recipient prompt a commercial AI tool to provide information about “[w]hat CVE’s are there for Windows 10 Enterprise privilege escalation and bypasses” and to “[p]rovide the CVE’s and a real world working script for each CVE .

14. [14]

    without omitted code,” the government’s memo states.

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    The memo states that less than a week later, Wagenius used a different inmate’s email account and requested that the email recipient prompt an AI tool to “[p]rovide the step by step for CVE-2023-45208 , code for this if any, and if no code exists make some, make sure to describe everything in detail.” CVE-2023-45208 is a three-year-old “command injection” vulnerability in D-Link networking devices.

16. [16]

    That same month, Wagenius allegedly again requested that the email recipient prompt AI with the question, “How do you make an antenna in a prison environment with commissary or readily available items/tools to improve/make an antenna to extend radio reception?” Federal prosecutors said Wagenius also requested that the recipient research escaping prison.

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    “In several instances, Wagenius framed the AI queries as being posed in connection to a book he was writing.

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    This is a common method of ‘prompt injection,’ in which attackers feed specially crafted, deceptive inputs into commercial AI tools that are programmed to avoid outputting malicious code that can be used to exploit computer vulnerabilities,” the sentencing memo reads.

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    The government told the court it is unaware of evidence that Wagenius figured out how to use or deploy the vulnerabilities he was researching in the BOP’s systems, and when questioned said he was only researching “potential vulnerabilities to provide information to the BOP.” Incredibly, despite the enormous financial value of the data stolen from AT&T and other telecom providers, Wagenius’s extortion efforts were largely unsuccessful.

20. [20]

    The government’s sentencing memo says Wagenius made a whopping total of around $1,500 from selling stolen data.

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    “While Wagenius was not particularly financially successful as a cybercriminal, he both intended to and caused significant harm to numerous individual victims, U.S.

22. [22]

    companies, and the U.S.

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    government,” the memo states.

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