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Why this day matters

  • GitLab fixes critical AI Gateway flaw that could let authenticated Duo users escape a prompt sandbox and execute commands on self-hosted gateways.
  • doxx.net’s new ADN platform prevents agentic misadventure while the agent is operating under the user’s authority. The post doxx.net Raises $38 Million to Prevent AI Agent-on-the-Internet Misadventures appeared first on SecurityWeek .
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Luna-enriched source article · securityaffairs

Antino Backdoor Lets China-Linked UAT-11587 Turn Microsoft 365 Into a C2 Channel

Cisco Talos tracks UAT-11587, which it assesses with high confidence as China-nexus; by July 2026, the group had targeted at least 16 government and policy organizations across eight Asian countries.

8 retained claims27 cited excerpts

Source published Oct 3, 2026, 9:26 AM UTC · Evidence retrieved Oct 3, 2026, 2:51 PM UTC

What happened

Cisco Talos tracks UAT-11587, which it assesses with high confidence as China-nexus; by July 2026, the group had targeted at least 16 government and policy organizations across eight Asian countries. [1] [2]

Antino is a Rust-compiled Windows backdoor supporting reconnaissance, shell and PowerShell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading and persistence on both 32-bit and 64-bit Windows. [3] [4] [5]

Antino uses Microsoft Graph with Outlook and OneDrive for command-and-control: it reads commands from an Outlook mailbox, returns results through email, and transfers stolen files through OneDrive. [6] [7] [8] [9]

The intrusion began with targeted phishing using researched decoy documents, including material copied from a Taiwan Ministry of Finance ruling and a reused Associated Press story. [12] [13] [14] [15]

The delivery chain used a Gmail-like attachment preview linking to an attacker-controlled page, followed by HTA, Windows Script Host and .NET deserialization stages; Antino was sideloaded through a signed Microsoft diagnostic binary. [21] [22] [23] [24]

Why it matters

Using Microsoft Graph allows Antino traffic to blend with normal Microsoft 365 activity; the implant polls its Outlook mailbox for commands every ten seconds. [7] [8] [10] [11]

A spoofed message passed SPF but failed DMARC alignment; because the impersonated domain used monitoring rather than rejection, the email still reached the inbox. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

Known limitations

Talos based its China-nexus assessment on development, preparation-environment and targeting indicators, including Simplified Chinese metadata, UTC+8 timestamps and a mainland-China Rust package mirror; the assessment was not attributed to a single indicator. [2] [25] [26] [27]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

  1. [1]
    Cisco Talos has been tracking a cluster of espionage activity since September 2025 that it calls UAT-11587, and by July 2026 the group had hit at least 16 government and policy organizations across eight Asian countries.
  2. [2]
    “Based on the development, preparation-environment, and targeting indicators detailed in this report, Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11587 is China-nexus.” the report concludes.
  3. [3]
    Antino is written in Rust and works on both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Windows.
  4. [4]
    It supports the usual backdoor features, including shell and PowerShell access, file transfers, in-memory shellcode execution and persistence.
  5. [5]
    “Antino is a Rust-compiled Windows backdoor that supports host reconnaissance, shell and PowerShell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading and persistence.
  6. [6]
    Its native command-and-control channel operates exclusively through Microsoft 365, using Microsoft Graph to interact with Outlook and OneDrive.” reads the report published by Talos.
  7. [7]
    What makes Antino different is how it communicates: instead of using its own command-and-control server, it uses Microsoft Graph to read commands from an Outlook mailbox and send stolen files to OneDrive.
  8. [8]
    Once Antino is running, it checks its Outlook mailbox for new commands every ten seconds.
  9. [9]
    “Command messages are identified by the subject prefix command_req_[session_id] and responses by command_res_[session_id], as indicated in the HTTP GET request sent by Antino: “ A separate system is used to upload stolen files to one OneDrive folder and download attacker tools from another.
  10. [10]
    This allows its traffic to blend in with normal Microsoft 365 activity.
  11. [11]
    The implant actively pulls commands from the threat actor’s Outlook mailbox folder every 10 seconds.
  12. [12]
    The attack starts in a more traditional way, with a convincing phishing email.
  13. [13]
    UAT-11587 created highly targeted documents that suggest the attackers had researched their victims, including a fake workshop document about Taiwan’s information warfare and a document that closely copied a real Taiwan Ministry of Finance ruling about tax treatment for legislators.
  14. [14]
    “The document exactly reproduces a public Taiwan Ministry of Finance ruling to make the decoy appear credible.” conctinues the report.
  15. [15]
    “Its subject strongly suggests that it was prepared for members of Taiwan’s public sector.” In another case, the attackers reused a real Associated Press story about alleged Russian offers to the US over Venezuela.
  16. [16]
    The delivery trick is a simple but effective email spoofing technique that takes advantage of a gap many people overlook.
  17. [17]
    The attackers sent the email through a legitimate provider, using one domain as the technical sender, while the visible From address showed the organization they were impersonating.
  18. [18]
    SPF passed because the real sending domain was authorized, but DMARC detected the mismatch and failed.
  19. [19]
    That still wasn’t enough to block the message.
  20. [20]
    The impersonated domain had a DMARC policy set to monitoring rather than rejection, so the failed email still reached the inbox.
  21. [21]
    The attackers recreated Gmail’s normal attachment preview card almost pixel by pixel using images embedded in the email’s HTML.
  22. [22]
    They then made the fake preview a link to a page controlled by the attackers.
  23. [23]
    From that click, a five-stage chain kicks in, leaning on legitimate-looking HTA files, Windows Script Host, and a scripted .NET deserialization trick that abuses a known gadget chain to load malicious code inside a trusted process.
  24. [24]
    The final stage sideloads Antino through a signed Microsoft diagnostic binary, meaning the thing dropping the backdoor onto disk is a tool Windows itself trusts by default.
  25. [25]
    The attribution case leans on accumulated small details rather than any single smoking gun, which is honestly how these assessments should work.
  26. [26]
    Decoy document metadata carries Simplified Chinese language tags and a UTC+8 timestamp, a combination more consistent with mainland China than Taiwan or Hong Kong, where Traditional Chinese dominates.
  27. [27]
    Separately, ten different Antino builds reference a Rust package mirror built specifically to speed up dependency downloads inside mainland China, the kind of tooling choice a developer picks for convenience, not for disguise.

Read the original article →

Luna-enriched source article · the hacker news

Warlock Exploits SharePoint Flaws to Disable Security Tools and Deploy Ransomware

The suspected China-linked threat actor Warlock is continuing to weaponize Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities, likely including both older and newer flaws, against organizations in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries.

2 retained claims2 cited excerpts

Source published Oct 3, 2026, 2:36 PM UTC · Evidence retrieved Oct 4, 2026, 1:23 AM UTC

What happened

The suspected China-linked threat actor Warlock is continuing to weaponize Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities, likely including both older and newer flaws, against organizations in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries. [1]

Observed activity has targeted critical infrastructure, government, and education organizations, according to the Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team. [2]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

  1. [1]
    The suspected China-linked threat actor known as Warlock is still continuing to weaponize Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities, likely both old and new, in attacks targeting organizations in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries.
  2. [2]
    The activity, observed by the Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team, has hit critical infrastructure, government, and education organizations.

Read the original article →

Luna-enriched source article · securityaffairs

Fake Zoom installer hides macOS backdoor CloudSyncD

Jamf Threat Labs identified CloudSyncD as a fake macOS Zoom installer that uses invisible zero-width Unicode characters to conceal a phished password.

8 retained claims30 cited excerpts

Source published Oct 3, 2026, 3:11 PM UTC · Evidence retrieved Oct 3, 2026, 8:51 PM UTC

What happened

Jamf Threat Labs identified CloudSyncD as a fake macOS Zoom installer that uses invisible zero-width Unicode characters to conceal a phished password. [1] [2] [3] [4]

The disk image presents a Zoom-branded volume and instructs users to bypass Gatekeeper because the app is only ad-hoc signed. [5] [6] [7]

The installer repeatedly prompts for the local account password, validates it with dscl, and proceeds only after the validation succeeds. [8] [9] [10]

After validation, the malware encodes the password, adds variable filler, and stores it in a field resembling an application cache value in data.json. [11] [12] [13] [14]

The dropper contains a complete universal Mach-O payload and first attempts execution from memory; after that method failed in testing because of System Integrity Protection, it writes a temporary file and runs it with sudo using the stolen password. [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

Why it matters

The second-stage implant checks in every 8 to 16 seconds with a hardware identifier and can receive either a compressed archive or a complete executable to unpack or run. [21] [22] [23]

By publication, samples were communicating with two live domains; neither domain was detected as malicious at that time, and all samples used the same encryption key and initialization vector. [24] [25] [26] [27]

Known limitations

In recovered builds, the cleanup mechanism was present but did not activate because its intended replacement bundle was absent. [28] [29] [30]

Cited source evidence

These excerpts support the numbered claims above. They come from one source article and do not establish independent corroboration.

  1. [1]
    Jamf Threat Labs details CloudSyncD, a fake macOS Zoom installer that hides a phished password using invisible zero-width Unicode characters.
  2. [2]
    Jamf Threat Labs found CloudSyncD while doing routine scanning on VirusTotal, buried inside a disguised Zoom client.
  3. [3]
    The trick used to find the hidden password is also where the file gets its name.
  4. [4]
    When decoded, they tell the malware where the real password starts and how long it is inside the padded text.
  5. [5]
    The delivery method is a classic macOS trick, made to look like a normal installer.
  6. [6]
    The disk image opens as a volume called Zoom, with an app icon and an Applications shortcut.
  7. [7]
    The background image then guides the victim step by step on how to bypass Gatekeeper, because the app is only ad-hoc signed and macOS would normally block it.
  8. [8]
    After the app starts, a fake dialog asks for the user’s password, claiming it is needed to continue the installation.
  9. [9]
    The prompt keeps appearing until the password is correct.
  10. [10]
    “Once a password is entered, the dropper validates it against the local account using dscl and does not continue until the check succeeds.” reads the analysis published by Jamf Threat Labs.
  11. [11]
    “After the password has been validated a fake progress window reading Downloading Zoom...
  12. [12]
    appears.” The captured password doesn’t get sent anywhere immediately.
  13. [13]
    It gets base64 encoded, padded with a random amount of filler text, and buried inside a field that looks like an innocent cache value in a fake settings file named data.json.
  14. [14]
    The amount of filler changes each time, so the password is hidden in a different position on every run, while the technique stays the same.
  15. [15]
    The malware does not download the payload separately.
  16. [16]
    The full payload is already inside the dropper as a universal Mach-O file.
  17. [17]
    It first tries to run the payload directly from memory through an anonymous file descriptor, avoiding writing it to disk.
  18. [18]
    On most Macs, however, System Integrity Protection blocks this method.
  19. [19]
    Jamf also saw the attempt fail during testing and recorded the exact error.
  20. [20]
    When the fileless method fails, the malware writes the payload to a temporary file and runs it with sudo , using the password it just stole to get the privileges it needs.
  21. [21]
    The second stage, which Jamf calls cloudsyncd after its disguised daemon name, is a fairly restrained implant once it’s actually running.
  22. [22]
    It just builds a working directory, logs its activity with encrypted records, and checks in with its server every 8 to 16 seconds carrying nothing but a hardware identifier.
  23. [23]
    The server can send back either a compressed archive to unpack or a complete executable to run.
  24. [24]
    By the time Jamf published its research, the malware had moved beyond testing and was communicating with two live domains.
  25. [25]
    Both were registered through the same registrar in 2011 and were protected by Cloudflare.
  26. [26]
    At the time, neither domain was detected as malicious.
  27. [27]
    All the samples also used the same encryption key and initialization vector.
  28. [28]
    Upon failure, it uses mkstemp to write the file temporarily to disk, then executes it using sudo along with the collected user’s password.” A cleanup script follows, assembled at runtime from scattered obfuscated fragments and designed to swap in a replacement app bundle before deleting itself either way.
  29. [29]
    In the builds Jamf actually recovered, though, the replacement bundle simply doesn’t exist, so this entire swap mechanism never fires.
  30. [30]
    It’s a feature built and wired up for a payload that hadn’t shipped yet.

Read the original article →

Published records

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Material developments

Fortra Patches Critical Vulnerabilities in BoKS

Securityweek published a source item for review.

1 source recordContext source

What happened

Securityweek published a source item for review.

Why it matters

A reviewed impact interpretation has not been published for this record.

Reviewed next steps

  • Review the exact source item and determine whether it changes exposure or monitoring priorities.

Evidence

Known limitation

This item is supported by one source record and has not been independently corroborated here.

Threat and risk signals

CVE-2026-90970: Critical GitLab AI Gateway Flaw Fixed

Securityaffairs published details for CVE-2026-90970.

1 source recordContext source

What happened

Securityaffairs published details for CVE-2026-90970.

Why it matters

A reviewed impact interpretation has not been published for this record.

Structured associations

CVE-2026-90970 mentioned

Reviewed next steps

  • Check asset inventory and patch status for CVE-2026-90970.

Evidence

Known limitation

This item is supported by one source record and has not been independently corroborated here.

Cloud and infrastructure

The State of Cybersecurity in 2026: Key Segments, Insights, and Innovations

The Hacker News published a source item for review.

1 source recordContext source

What happened

The Hacker News published a source item for review.

Why it matters

A reviewed impact interpretation has not been published for this record.

Reviewed next steps

  • Review the exact source item and determine whether it changes exposure or monitoring priorities.

Evidence

Known limitation

This item is supported by one source record and has not been independently corroborated here.

AI and model reality

doxx.net Raises $38 Million to Prevent AI Agent-on-the-Internet Misadventures

Securityweek published a source item for review.

1 source recordContext source

What happened

Securityweek published a source item for review.

Why it matters

A reviewed impact interpretation has not been published for this record.

Reviewed next steps

  • Review the exact source item and determine whether it changes exposure or monitoring priorities.

Evidence

Known limitation

This item is supported by one source record and has not been independently corroborated here.