Why Ethereum Needs Fairness Mechanisms that Do Not Depend on Participant Altruism
2026-03-09T08:52:20Z•fbd33d74763fb2d90236414847569a30dc276f18cddd9ad4afb83c45c7309f04
DoSEthereumFaaSLLM-servingMixture-of-ExpertsMoEUAVs','mobile-agents'block-proposer-centralizationblockchaincensorship-resistancedeepfakesedge-AIfairness-mechanismsfederated-learningfunction-fusionincentiveslatency-throughput-tradeoffmodel-servingmultimodal-generationprivacyreal-time-streamingresource-exhaustionserverlessserverless-inferencesmart-contracts
What happened
This collection of recent research highlights systemic risks and attack surfaces across decentralized systems, model serving, and edge/mobile AI. Key findings: (1) Ethereum proposer centralization is severe—~91% blind-delegate to external builders and <1.4% consistently act to preserve decentralization/censorship-resistance—implying that fairness mechanisms that assume altruistic proposers are ineffective and that incentive/penalty mechanisms are needed to mitigate censorship and centralization risks. (2) LLM and MoE serving (dense and sparse) expose availability and latency risks—expert load-
Why it matters
A reviewed impact interpretation has not been published for this record.
Evidence and limitations
- Source ID
- arxiv_cs_dc
- Record identifier
- fbd33d74763fb2d90236414847569a30dc276f18cddd9ad4afb83c45c7309f04
- Enrichment time
- 2026-03-09T08:52:20Z
- AI-assisted enrichment
- Yes
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