From Rocq to Metal: A Pipeline for Formally Verified Microcontroller Firmware
2026-06-03T08:52:02Z•6eef36de31fe50e683cf5063c4883608cac49aff085f3320705ae6def76991d5
CPS VMElixirEncore!IsabelleLLM-assisted proof synthesisLLMs in securityLean 4Lean-GAPOpenZeppelinRocqSAILSolidityabstract interpretationautoformalizationfirmwarefloating-point analysisformal verificationgradual typingmicrocontrollermutation testingpolynomial invariantsreentrancysmart contractsstate-transition modeltheorem proving
What happened
Collection of recent formal-methods research with direct security relevance: (1) Encore! demonstrates a bare-metal CPS VM running Rocq-extracted Scheme on microcontrollers and a pattern for structuring firmware as a pure state-transition function so the core can be machine-proved; the workflow integrates LLM-assisted tactic synthesis to let AI-generated firmware produce proofs. (2) A machine-checked, tridirectional verification of the OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuard against production Solidity instances (DAO, Compound v2, Aave V3) reproduces attacks and proves boundary/correctness properties, bol
Why it matters
A reviewed impact interpretation has not been published for this record.
Evidence and limitations
- Source ID
- arxiv_cs_pl
- Record identifier
- 6eef36de31fe50e683cf5063c4883608cac49aff085f3320705ae6def76991d5
- Enrichment time
- 2026-06-03T08:52:02Z
- AI-assisted enrichment
- Yes
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