Protect data in transit
Select and troubleshoot TLS, certificate, private-path, service-to-service, and inter-resource encryption controls.
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Protect data in transit, at rest, and in use through ownership-aware encryption, key lifecycle decisions, secret handling, discovery, masking, and evidence.
Select and troubleshoot TLS, certificate, private-path, service-to-service, and inter-resource encryption controls.
Choose encryption ownership, key material, rotation, grants, multi-Region strategy, access evidence, and recovery behavior.
Discover, classify, mask, store, rotate, scope, and monitor access to confidential material throughout its lifecycle.
Data protection begins with the data and its lifecycle, not with an encryption checkbox. Identify classification, owner, subjects, locations, transformations, readers, writers, retention, recovery, deletion, and regulatory or contractual constraints. Then decide which controls protect confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and auditability in each state: in transit, at rest, in processing, in backups, and in logs.
Encryption is one control. Authorization, minimization, isolation, discovery, masking, retention, monitoring, resilient key management, and verified deletion remain necessary.
| Objective | Required judgment | Proof |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 Protect data in transit | Select TLS, certificates, private paths, mutual trust, and inter-resource encryption | Approved clients succeed, downgrade or bypass paths fail, and certificate lifecycle is observable |
| 5.2 Protect data at rest | Select ownership, key material, policy, grants, rotation, Region, backup, and recovery behavior | Authorized decrypt works, unauthorized decrypt fails, and recovery is tested |
| 5.3 Protect confidential data, credentials, secrets, and key material | Discover, classify, minimize, mask, store, rotate, scope, monitor, and delete sensitive material | Sensitive data and secrets follow an owned lifecycle with access evidence |
Map every hop. Client-to-edge, edge-to-origin, service-to-service, database, queue, stream, administrative, hybrid, replication, and backup paths can have different TLS termination and trust owners. Use AWS Certificate Manager for supported public and private certificate integrations; use AWS Private CA when the organization needs managed private certificate authority capabilities. A private network path reduces exposure but does not automatically provide the required encryption or peer authentication.
Choose server authentication, mutual TLS, or application-level signing from the threat model. Verify certificate name, issuer trust, protocol and cipher policy, renewal, deployment, revocation expectations, and monitoring. Do not hardcode expiring certificates into images. Where a managed service supports enforced transport conditions, use them with service and resource policies. For hybrid links, distinguish the connectivity service from encryption: Direct Connect is not an automatic encrypted channel, while VPN and application TLS solve different layers.
AWS KMS commonly provides envelope-encryption key management for integrated services. Understand the ownership choices. AWS owned keys are managed for service use and offer the least customer control. AWS managed keys are visible in the account but have service-managed policy and lifecycle constraints. Customer managed KMS keys provide customer policy, grants, lifecycle, and audit control. Imported key material, custom key stores, and external key stores add ownership or control options but also add availability, durability, operations, and recovery responsibility. Multi-Region keys help specific cross-Region cryptographic designs; they are not a default disaster-recovery requirement.
Separate key policy from data policy. An S3 bucket policy might permit object access while the KMS key denies decrypt, or the key may allow decrypt while the bucket denies object access. Evaluate the caller, service integration, encryption context, grants, key state, Region, alias versus key identity, and cross-account ownership. Key administrators should not automatically be data users. Limit who can change key policy, schedule deletion, disable keys, create grants, import material, or alter rotation.
Rotation reduces exposure to a key version but does not revoke access already granted to a principal. Re-encryption, credential revocation, or data migration may be required for a compromise. Backups encrypted by a deleted or inaccessible key are not recoverable simply because the backup exists. Test restoration, cross-account copy, cross-Region recovery, and key availability together.
Use Secrets Manager when managed rotation, secret version staging, and supported integration are required. Systems Manager Parameter Store can hold configuration and secure strings with different feature and cost characteristics. Neither fixes a workload role that can read every secret. Scope secret access, key access, network path, rotation function, resource policy, and logging. Avoid placing secrets in source, images, environment output, command history, logs, tracing attributes, or infrastructure state that is broadly readable.
For data discovery, Amazon Macie can help identify sensitive data in Amazon S3. Classification still needs ownership and response. Use masking, tokenization, redaction, aggregation, or synthetic data based on the use case. Remove sensitive fields from telemetry unless they are necessary and governed. Data loss prevention depends on knowing sanctioned paths and business use; a detection with no owner or response does not protect data.
| Need | Prefer | Key tradeoff |
|---|---|---|
| Service default encryption with no customer policy requirement | AWS owned or AWS managed key when supported and sufficient | Less customer control and separation |
| Customer-controlled access and lifecycle | Customer managed KMS key | More policy, monitoring, recovery, and cost responsibility |
| Customer-supplied key material | Imported material only when requirement justifies it | Customer owns material durability and expiration consequences |
| Automatic application-secret rotation | Secrets Manager with bounded rotation role | Rotation design, dependency behavior, and per-secret cost |
| Low-complexity encrypted configuration | Parameter Store SecureString where features fit | Different rotation and lifecycle capabilities |
| Identify sensitive S3 content | Macie plus owned classification response | Discovery does not itself restrict or remediate access |
A regulated workload stores records in S3, processes them in Lambda, writes derived data to a database, and replicates backups to another account and Region.