title: "SCS-C03 Guided Labs" summary: "A set of review-gated AWS security labs with validation, teardown, cost, evidence, and safe-operation requirements."

Safe lab operating rules

Use a dedicated non-production AWS account, synthetic data, least privilege, budget alerts, and a written teardown owner. Record the active account and Region before creating anything. Never weaken production controls to make a lab easier.

Each lab has two modes:

  1. Architecture mode — complete the requirements, data flow, policies, failure analysis, and validation plan without creating resources.
  2. Sandbox mode — implement only after confirming pricing, permissions, Region support, and cleanup dependencies.

Validation is not “the console shows enabled.” Generate a harmless known event, prove the expected path, introduce one controlled failure, observe the failure evidence, restore the control, and prove recovery. Preserve only sanitized evidence without account IDs, credentials, secrets, or customer information.

Publication boundary

The procedures on this branch are complete curriculum drafts, but they remain in technical review. Their status becomes published only after execution against the current service behavior, successful cleanup, validation metadata, and named technical review.

scs-l01 · technical-review

Build an organization logging control plane

90 min

Centralize protected activity and configuration evidence while separating log administration from workload administration.

Objectives
1.1, 1.2, 6.1, 6.3
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Member accounts → organization trail/configuration sources → dedicated log archive → monitored security account.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Write the account, Region, retention, and access requirements.
  2. Create or inspect a dedicated encrypted log destination with restrictive resource and key policies.
  3. Enable organization-aware collection and delegated security administration where available.
  4. Create alerts for disabled collection, policy change, delivery failure, and unauthorized access.

Validate

  1. Generate a test event in a member context and locate it centrally.
  2. Demonstrate that a workload administrator cannot alter retained evidence.
  3. Record the exact policy path that permits delivery and denies tampering.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Disable test alerts.
  2. Delete test member resources, trails, delivery channels, and temporary keys in dependency order.
  3. Retain only sanitized notes and screenshots without account identifiers.
scs-l02 · technical-review

Route and validate security findings

90 min

Normalize, prioritize, enrich, and route a representative finding without losing source context.

Objectives
1.1, 1.3
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Finding source → normalization/aggregation → event routing → responder target with ownership and retry behavior.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Define severity, account, resource, and ownership fields required by responders.
  2. Create a test finding or use an approved sample event.
  3. Route it through an event rule to a non-production target.
  4. Add failure handling and document suppression boundaries.

Validate

  1. Confirm one input produces one expected routed record.
  2. Break one permission deliberately and trace the failure through logs and metrics.
  3. Restore the permission and verify recovery.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Remove the rule, target, test finding, queue/topic, and temporary role.
scs-l03 · technical-review

Contain an incident while preserving evidence

90 min

Use reversible isolation, evidence capture, and a documented decision log before recovery.

Objectives
2.1, 2.2
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Simulated compromised workload → evidence snapshot/log export → quarantine control → clean recovery path.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Define incident commander, evidence owner, and stop conditions.
  2. Create a harmless workload and generate known activity.
  3. Capture time, identity, configuration, and storage evidence before containment.
  4. Apply a reversible quarantine and document every action.

Validate

  1. Prove the workload is isolated without destroying evidence.
  2. Reconstruct the action timeline from retained records.
  3. Recover from a known-good state and verify monitoring.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Delete the simulated workload, snapshots, temporary forensic role, isolation controls, and exported test data.
scs-l04 · technical-review

Investigate effective AWS permissions

90 min

Explain an authorization result across identity, resource, boundary, session, organization, and key-policy layers.

Objectives
4.1, 4.2
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Federated test role → session policy and boundary → resource and KMS policies → organization guardrail.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Create a permission matrix with expected allows and denies.
  2. Implement a test role, resource policy, and permissions boundary in a sandbox.
  3. Test allowed, implicitly denied, and explicitly denied operations.
  4. Use policy simulation and activity records to explain each result.

Validate

  1. For every test, identify the controlling policy statement and evaluation layer.
  2. Confirm an explicit deny remains effective when another layer allows.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Delete the role, boundary, policies, sessions, resource, and test key.
scs-l05 · technical-review

Compare cross-account guardrails

90 min

Choose the correct combination of role trust, resource policy, SCP/RCP, and delegated administration.

Objectives
4.2, 6.1
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Organization root/OUs → policy guardrails → delegated administrator → cross-account role and protected resource.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Write four cross-account access requirements and ownership boundaries.
  2. Model the effective permissions path for each requirement.
  3. Implement one minimal cross-account pattern in sandbox accounts if available.
  4. Document how an SCP or RCP changes the result.

Validate

  1. Demonstrate intended access and one intentional deny.
  2. Explain why a permissions boundary cannot replace an organization policy.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Remove cross-account trust, policies, test resources, and delegated test configuration.
scs-l06 · technical-review

Design and test a KMS-backed protection model

90 min

Select key ownership, policy, rotation, grants, encryption context, and recovery behavior for a sensitive data flow.

Objectives
5.1, 5.2, 5.3
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Producer → encrypted data service using customer-managed KMS key → approved consumer with audited decrypt path.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Classify the data and identify producer, custodian, and consumer roles.
  2. Create a customer-managed test key and least-privilege key policy.
  3. Encrypt representative non-sensitive data and test authorized access.
  4. Test an unauthorized principal and inspect the evidence.

Validate

  1. Show the authorized and denied decrypt events.
  2. Explain imported versus AWS-generated material and when multi-Region keys are justified.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Schedule key deletion only after deleting encrypted test resources and confirming no dependency remains.
  2. Delete temporary roles and logs not required for the exercise.
scs-l07 · technical-review

Rotate a workload secret safely

90 min

Separate human and workload access, rotate without exposing plaintext, and verify rollback behavior.

Objectives
5.3
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Test workload identity → managed secret → rotation function/workflow → audit and failure alerts.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Create a non-sensitive test credential and managed secret.
  2. Grant one workload identity scoped read access without console-user access.
  3. Configure or simulate rotation stages and failure handling.
  4. Observe access and rotation evidence.

Validate

  1. Confirm old and new stages behave as designed.
  2. Demonstrate that logs do not contain the secret value.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Delete the secret without recovery only after the test consumer is removed; delete rotation resources and roles.
scs-l08 · technical-review

Secure a private workload and remediate drift

90 min

Combine segmentation, private service access, IaC controls, drift detection, and reversible remediation.

Objectives
2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 6.2, 6.3
Cost
Usually under USD $3 when completed in one sitting; verify current AWS pricing and remove all resources.
Validation
not-run: Procedure is source-aligned but must be executed in the target sandbox before publication.

Architecture or scenario

Private workload subnets → endpoints/inspection → configuration evaluation → event-driven remediation with approval boundary.

Prerequisites

  • Use an isolated non-production AWS account with budget alerts.
  • Start with least-privilege credentials and record the active Region.

Procedure

  1. Diagram trust boundaries and permitted traffic.
  2. Deploy a minimal private workload and service endpoint through IaC.
  3. Create a harmless noncompliant change and detect it.
  4. Run a reversible remediation or produce an approval request.

Validate

  1. Verify no unintended public route or address exists.
  2. Show drift evidence, remediation evidence, and the rollback path.

Teardown or closeout

  1. Destroy the IaC stack, endpoints, logs, roles, network resources, and temporary state bucket if created.